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Administrative Law
JOSEPH Z. FLEMING* and DAvID L. MALLORY**
The authors discuss recent developments in the field of ad-
ministrative law in Florida. They discuss the constitutional and
legal limitations imposed on the Florida legislature, administra-
tive agencies and judiciary when involved in the administrative
process. They then analyze the recent trend towards consolida-
tion of proceedings among agencies and conclude that, if the
trend is to gain any momentum, the legislature must redraft the
regulatory schemes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The growing complexity of modern society and the attendant
proliferation of diverse interest groups pressing for regulatory legis-
lation to protect specific interests, has prompted a continued in-
crease in the number and variety of administrative agencies.' Devel-
oped to interpret and apply general laws,2 administrative agencies
provide the requisite attention to detail, the case by case balancing
of interests and the sensitivity to changing conditions which cannot
be translated into specific legislative pronouncements.' As the
Member of the Florida Bar; Partner, Fleming & Neuman, Miami, Florida.
Member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. See, e.g., Fleming, Environmental Litigation: An Analysis of Basic Strategies, Proce-
dures, Substantive Rights and Their Effects, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 749, 750 (1978).
2. See State v. Cumming, 365 So. 2d 153, 155 (Fla. 1978).
3. This has long been recognized by the Florida courts. See, e.g., South Atlantic S.S.
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clamor for legislative solutions to social problems has spawned a
plethora of administrative agencies, the field of administrative law
has become an increasingly important.part of the practice of law.4
In the. State of Florida, the Administrative Procedure Act5 (APA)
establishes the basic procedural framework for administrative agen-
cies,' to ensure that adjudicative procedures of agencies operate
uniformly,' and to protect the due process rights of all individuals
affected by agency action.'
This comment will highlight the developments in Florida ad-
migistrative law in 1977 and 1978. It will cover the limitations on
the legislature when creating the agencies,' the limitations on the
agencies when exercising their powers's and the limitations on the
judiciary when reviewing administrative action." The comment will
also analyze specific amendments to the APA 2 and the future direc-
tion of administrative law."3
11. LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGISLATURE
The principal limitation on the legislature when creating or
empowering agencies is the constitutional doctrine of delegation of
powers. The general rule for determining an unlawful delegation is
as follows:
"When the statute is couched in vague and uncertain terms
or is so broad in scope that no one can say with certainty, from
the terms of the law itself, what would be deemed an infringe-
ment of the law, it must be held unconstitutional as attempting
Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 418, 190 So. 675, 680 (1939). See also State v. Cumming, 365 So.
2d 153, 155 (Fla. 1978).
4. As administrative agencies multiply and expand, private interests become subject to
governmental control. The heightened regulation of private interests has increasingly been
contested. Indicative of this trend is the fact that the number of appeals reaching the federal
courts from agencies increased from 1,522 in 1970 to 2,205 in 1974. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEvMrIEs § 1.04, at 10 (1976).
5. FiA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1977 & Supp. 1978).
6. Id. at § 120.72(1)(a) (Supp. 1978) (legislative intent to create uniform administrative
procedures and to supplant all other such acts). In fact, the Florida APA is being considered
as a model for the revision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Miami Herald, Nov.
7, 1978, § A, at 9, col. 1.
7. Chung-Ling Yu v. Criser, 330 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
8. See, e.g., FiA. STAT. §§ 120.54, .57, .68 (Supp. 1978) (establishing procedures for
rulemaking, adjudicative hearings and judicial review).
9. See notes 14-33 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 34-69 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 70-121 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 122-62 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 163-77 and accompanying text infra.
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to grant to the administrative body the power to say what the law
shall be. ""
Thus, it is essential that the delegating act limit the agency's discre-
tion in exercising power and guide the agency in implementing pol-
icy. 15
The Supreme Court of Florida applied this standard when it
held section 112.313(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1975) an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Commission on
Ethics." The statute in question made it illegal for any public offi-
cial to accept any gift which "would cause a reasonably prudent
person to be influenced in the discharge of official duties."'" Al-
though recognizing that vagueness in a statute could be cured if the
terms used had acquired a sufficiently well-established meaning in
trade usage, in the common law or in federal law, the court held that
the reasonably prudent man test had not acquired a specific mean-
ing."8 Consequently, because section 112.322(2)(a)" permitted the
Commission on Ethics to render advisory opinions on the legality of
proposed actions, section 112.313(2) (a) was an unconstitutional del-
egation of the legislative power.
It is well established that a court may examine statutory sec-
tions related to those contested to determine if those contested are
unconstitutionally vague. For instance, in City of Belle Glade v.
Florida East Coast Railway, " the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, upheld a statute2' which required the city to apply to the
Department of Transportation for a permit prior to constructing a
crossing over the railroad's right-of-way. In upholding the validity
of the statute, the court looked to other sections of the Florida
Statutes2 to provide guidelines and limitations on the Department
of Transportation in the issuance of the permits.2
14. D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164, 169 (Fla. 1977) (quoting Conner v. Joe
Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1968) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
15. Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 1962). The Supreme
Court of Florida has stated that the delegation doctrine is constitutionally mandated by FLA.
CONST. art. 11, § 3, which states that "[n]o person belonging to one branch shall exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."
Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. 1978).
16. 349 So. 2d at 169.
17. FLA. STAT. § 112.313(2)(a) (1975).
18. 349 So. 2d at 168.
19. FLA. STAT. § 112.322(2)(a) (1975) (current version at id. (1977)).
20. 344 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
21. FLA. STAT. § 338.21 (1973) (current version at id. (Supp. 1978)).
22. Id. § 334.02 (legislative intent).
23. 344 So. 2d at 875.
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Another restriction on agency discretion which might serve to
validate an otherwise invalid delegation of power, derives from the
procedural safeguards contained in the APA. In Albrecht v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation," the petitioners challenged the
validity of section 253.124(2)25 on the basis that the phrase "to such
an extent as to be contrary to the public interest" was not suffi-
ciently specific to provide adequate standards for administrative
decisionmaking.11 In addition to certain criteria enumerated in the
statute, the court relied on the APA and its "significant procedural
safeguards which serve to restrict [the Department of Environmen-
tal Regulation's] discretion in considering permit applications,''27
to uphold the validity of the statute. The court concluded that the
APA's "procedural safeguards [had] lessened the need for strict
statutory standards in the delegation of power to administrative
agencies."28
In Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,29 however, the Supreme
Court of Florida rejected the argument that the procedural safe-
guards contained in the APA will by themselves cure an unconstitu-
tional delegation of power. Section 380.05(1)(a) of the Florida Stat-
utese authorized the Division of State Planning to recommend the
designation of certain areas as "areas of critical state concern" to
the Administration Commission. Although noting that the specific-
ity of the guidelines may depend on the subject matter and its
susceptibility to articulation of finite standards, the court held the
statute unconstitutional because the standards provided3
"reposited in the Administration Commission the fundamental leg-
islative task of determining which geographic areas and resources
are in greatest need of protection." 2 Thus, the statute was unconsti-
24. 353 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
25. FLA. STAT. § 253.124(2) (1975) (establishes procedure for approval of fill permits).
26. 353 So. 2d at 885.
27. Id. at 886.
28. Id. at 887.
29. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
30. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(1)(a) (1975).
31. (2) An area of critical state concern may be designated only for:
(a) An area containing, or having a significant impact upon, environmental,
historical, natural, or archaeological resources of regional or statewide import-
ance.
(b) An area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect upon, an
existing or proposed major public facility or other area of major public invest-
ment.
(c) A proposed area of major development potential, which may include a
proposed site of a new community, designated in a state land development plan.
Id. § 380.05(2).
32. 372 So. 2d at 919. The court concluded the opinion by suggesting two alternative
[Vol. 33:735
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tutional because it relegated a primary policy decision to the admin-
istrative agency. Moreover, the court in Askew specifically rejected
the argument that the procedural safeguards alone would cure an
otherwise invalid delegation, because article II, section 3, of the
Constitution of the State of Florida mandated the delegation doc-
trine.3
III. ADJUDICATION VERSUS RULEMAKIG: THE PARAMETERS OF AGENCY
DECISIONMAKING
In implementing their decisions, administrative agencies may
choose one of two methods: (1) they may promulgate rules and
regulations which establish standards to be followed by all; or (2)
they may seek to compel an individual to conform to a specific
standard through an adjudicative hearing. The APA prescribes the
procedures to be followed by the agency in each case. 3' Each proce-
dure has advantages and disadvantages. Once an agency has ex-
pressed its policy in a valid rule, the agency does not have to defend
its policy every time it seeks compliance; it merely invokes the
rule." Once a rule is promulgated, however, the agency has little
discretion over the future application of that rule. On the other
hand, adjudicative proceedings provide the agency with greater
flexibility in the implementation of policy."
Although there is no similar requirement in the federal sys-
tem, 37 the Florida courts have required that particular agency deci-
sions be implemented via the rulemaking proceedings rather than
by adjudicative hearings.u This has been achieved by analyzing the
agency decision to determine whether it falls within the statutory
statutory schemes which would pass constitutional muster. The first scheme would require
the legislature to choose the areas in advance, as was done with the Big Cypress area in FLA.
STAT. § 380.055 (1977). Alternatively, the legislature could adopt a procedure which would
involve legislative ratification of administratively developed recommendations, a scheme
approved of in CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d
306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Ct. App. 1974). 372 So. 2d at 920.
33. 372 So. 2d at 924. For the text of FA. CONST. art. 11, § 3, see note 15 supra.
34. The procedures for rulemaking are established in FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (Supp. 1978);
those for adjudicative hearings are established in id. § 120.57.
35. Department of Admin. v. Harvey, 356 So. 2d 323, 326-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
36. For a discussion of the necessary balance between the need for agency compliance
with its own rules and the need for flexibility to operate by use of adjudicative hearings to
impose agency policy in specific cases, see McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346
So. 2d 569, 580-82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
37. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1946) (no requirement that federal
agencies use rulemaking procedures in some instances and adjudication in others).
38. E.g., Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
1979]
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definition of "rule"'" and, if so, requiring that those decisions be
implemented through section 120.5410 proceedings.
As can be expected, the definition of "rule" has been the sub-
ject of much recent litigation. In Price Wise Buying Group v.
Nuzum,"1 the Director of the Division of Beverages issued a declara-
tory statement rescinding a memorandum issued by the former
director which had "represented the [division's] official position
regarding the extension of credit to vendors and ha[d] been relied
upon by the members of the alcoholic beverage industry in Flor-
ida." 2 The court held that the declaratory statement was a rule
because it was an agency statement of general applicability which
implemented, interpreted, or prescribed law or policy.
A finding that an agency statement is a rule is significant,
because a hearing officer of the Department of Administrative Hear-
ings has the authority to declare an agency decision invalid if it is
premised on an invalidly promulgated rule. 3 In Department of
39. (14) "Rule" means each agency statement of general applicability that
implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which
imposes any requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by
statute or by an existing rule. The term also includes the-amendment or repeal
of a rule. The term does not include:
(a) Internal management memoranda which do not affect either the private
interests of any person or any plan or procedure important to the public and which
have no application outside the agency issuing the memorandum.
(b) Legal memoranda or opinions issued to an agency by the Attorney Gen-
eral or agency legal opinions prior to their use in connection with an agency
action.
(c) The preparation or modification of:
1. Agency budgets.
2. Contractual provisions reached as a result of collective bargaining.
3. Agricultural marketing orders under chapter 573 or chapter 601.
4. Curricula by an educational unit.
(d) Agency action which has the effect of altering established hunting or
fishing seasons when such action is adequately noticed in the area affected
through publishing in a newspaper of general circulation or through notice by
broadcasting in an electronic media [sic].
FiA. STAT. § 120.52(14) (Supp. 1978).
40. Id. § 120.54.
41. 343 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
42. Id. at 115.
43. In contrast, administrative hearing officers generally do not have the authority to
determine the constitutionality of statutes as this is considered to be an intrinsically judicial
function. State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94
So. 681 (1922). For a discussion of the line of demarcation between judicial and administra-
tive authority, see notes 70-109 and accompanying text infra. See also Swan, Administrative
Adjudication of Constitutional Questions: Confusion in Florida Law and a Dying Misconcep-
tion in Federal Law, 33 U. MiLm L. REv. 527 (1979).
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Administration v. Stevens," Dr. Stevens, who had been laid off,
petitioned the Division of Administrative Hearings to declare in-
valid a directive of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services (HRS) and certain guidelines issued by the Department of
Administration (DOA). These guidelines and directives provided
"that when a lay-off [of an HRS employee] is to be made, an
employee with greater [sic] retention points can 'bump' or usurp
the job of another employee in the same class."" The hearing officer
found that the contested pronouncements were rules which had not
been adopted pursuant to the APA and, consequently, were invalid.
The DOA and HRS appealed, contending that the hearing officer
did not have the authority to declare that the HRS directive and
the DOA guidelines were invalidly adopted rules because such a
determination involved the exercise of judicial power.
Rejecting that argument, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, held that section 120.566 empowered the hearing officer to
make such a determination. The court premised its holding on the
basis that the hearing officer was exercising a validly delegated
quasi-judicial power expressly authorized, by article V, section 1 of
the Constitution of the State of Florida. 7 The court further held
that the statements in question were rules, because they purported
"to create certain rights and adversely affect others. 48
Given this interpretation of "rule," few agency pronounce-
ments, scrutinized closely, could avoid falling within the statutory
definition. Recognizing in this view a potentially chilling effect on
agencies' development of policy, the First District established
guidelines for invalidating an agency's action for failure to promul-
gate rules properly, in McDonald v. Department of Banking &
Finance. 41 In McDonald, the Comptroller of the Department of
44. 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
45. Id. at 291.
46. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (1975) (current version at id. (Supp. 1978)), which provides:
"(1) Any person substantially affected by a rule may seek an administrative determination
of the invalidity of the rule on the ground:
(a) That the rule is an invalid exercise of validly delegated legislative authority.
(b) That the rule is an exercise of invalidly delegated legislative authority."
Section 120.56(1) was amended by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-131, § 6, to read as follows:
"(1) Any person substantially affected by a rule may seek an administrative determination
of the invalidity of the rule on the ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority." Id. (Supp. 1978). This amendment withdraws any authority on the
part of the hearing officer to determine the validity of a statute delegating authority to the
agency.
47. 344 So. 2d at 291-92.
48. Id. at 296.
49. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
1979]
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Banking and Finance denied an application for a bank charter,
rejecting the hearing officer's findings of fact under the statutory
guidelines,00 without offering any evidence to contradict those find-
ings or explaining deviations from prior practices." The court re-
versed the agency,5" refusing to impose upon all statements of policy
the procedural requirements for rulemaking.
Although adopting the definition of "rule" given in Stevens 3 (a
policy statement of general applicability which by its own effect
creates rights or requires compliance), the court's opinion allowed
for the possibility of refining policy through adjudication of individ-
ual cases. 5 The court did uphold the imposition of rulemaking pro-
cedures in many cases, arguing that although not required explicitly
by the APA, the rulemaking procedures would atrophy unless the
court required their use in certain instances. 5 But since it recog-
nized that not all agency statements of general policy are invalid
because not expressed in a rule, the court analyzed the APA to
determine which agency decisions are void as improperly promul-
gated rules.5 The court noted that the APA requires an agency to
50. FLA. STAT. § 659.03(2) (1975) (repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, § 3, effective
July 1, 1980), provides the following criteria:
(2) The department shall approve or disapprove the application, in its dis-
cretion, but it shall not approve such application until, in its opinion:
(a) Public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the establish-
ment of the proposed bank or trust company.
(b) Local conditions assure reasonable promise of successful operation for
the proposed bank or the principal office of the proposed trust company and those
banks or trust companies already established in the community.
(c) The proposed capital structure is adequate.
(d) The proposed officers and directors have sufficient banking or trust
experience, ability and standing to assure reasonable promise of successful opera-
tion.
(e) The name of the proposed bank or trust company is not so similar as to
cause confusion with the name of an existing bank.
(f) Provision has been made for suitable banking house quarters in the area
specified in the application.
An agency may reject the hearing officer's findings only if they were not supported by compe-
tent substantial evidence or if the proceedings did not comply with the essential requirements
of the law. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(9) (Supp. 1978). A court may reverse an agency determi-
nation only if it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Id. § 120.68(10). Thus,
a court may face a conflict between the hearing officer's findings and the agency's determina-
tion, each due the same deference. For a discussion of how the District Court of Appeal, First
District, resolved this dilemma, see notes 110-121 and accompanying text infra.
51. 346 So. 2d at 584-86.
52. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(11) (Supp. 1976) (permitting remands to the agency).
53. Compare McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 581 with Stevens, 344 So. 2d at 296.
54. 346 So. 2d at 580-81.
55. Id. at 580.
56. Id. at 582-83.
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adopt procedures for the presentation of policy at agency hearings.57
Analogously, an agency must entertain challenges to policy in infor-
mal proceedings.58 Moreover, in its final orders, an agency must
describe its policy with sufficient specificity to permit judicial re-
view" and must explain and justify any deviation from an existing
rule.10
Thus, the First District concluded that policy not yet expressed
through rules may be presented in adjudicative hearings.' Such
policy, however, must be subject to challenge at hearings and be
established by evidence. Because validly promulgated rules elimi-
nate the need for debate of policy at hearings, the agency has an
incentive to utilize the rulemaking procedures.2 Consequently, be-
cause the department in this case had neither promulgated a rule
nor proven wrong the conclusions of the hearing officer, the agency's
order was vacated and the case remanded. 3
The ability to establish policy at hearings can be a two-edged
weapon. For example, in Department of Administration v. Harvey,4
a rejected applicant for a state job petitioned the Division of Admin-
istrative Hearings for a declaration that the minimum training and
experience requirements of the Division of Personnel were actually
invalidly adopted rules. The division petitioned for judicial review
of the hearing officer's determination that the requirements were
rules which had not been adopted pursuant to the APA's rulemak-
ing procedures. Despite the division's argument that to require sec-
tion 120.545 proceedings would be unduly burdensome,"6 the First
District affirmed the hearing officer, reasoning that it would be
much more burdensome for the agency to have to prove the validity
of its requirements at a hearing requested by a rejected applicant. 7
57. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(1)(c) (Supp. 1976).
58. Id. § 120.57(2)(a)(1)-(2).
59. Id. § 120.68(7).
60. Id. § 120.68(12)(b).
61. 346 So. 2d at 582.
62. Id. at 583.
63. Id. at 586.
64. 356 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
65. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (Supp. 1976) (current version at id. (Supp. 1978)).
66. There were approximately 2,900 job classifications with specifications for each class.
During the fiscal year 1975-76, 347 new classes were established, 106 classes were abolished
and 455 classes were revised. 356 So. 2d at 327 (McCord, C.J., dissenting).
67. 356 So. 2d at 326.
19791
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IV. THE PARAMETERS OF JuDicIAL REVIEW
A. Constitutional Issues
Although the APA provides for judicial review of "final agency
action,""8 the actual parameters of judicial intervention in the ad-
ministrative process have been the subject of much recent litigation.
Thus, it is well established that an administrative officer cannot
resolve a constitutional attack on a statute or rule, for that would
usurp the judicial power. 9 A hearing officer, however, may deter-
mine whether a rule has been validly adopted.70 Moreover, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, has held that a hearing officer
of the Department of Administrative Hearings has the authority to
pass upon the constitutionality of a proposed rule.7 Thus, the pre-
vailing rule is that while administrative officers may pass upon the
constitutionality of proposed rules, the determination of the consti-
tutionality of statutes and validly adopted rules is a uniquely judi-
cial function which is exclusively vested in the courts.72
B. Collateral Review by Circuit Courts
The APA vests all judicial power of direct review73 in the district
courts of appeal, except for those matters for which judicial review
by the Supreme Court of Florida is provided by law. Although
68. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (Supp. 1978).
Because "final agency action" is the primary jurisdictional requirement for judicial
review under the APA, the definition of the term has been the subject of much litigation. For
example, a hearing officer's determination of the validity or invalidity of a proposed rule
constitutes final agency action which is reviewable in the district court of appeal. 4245 Corp.,
Mother's Lounge v. Division of Beverage, 348 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Final
agency action also exists when the rules are filed with the Department of State. Florida
Admin. Comm'n v. District Court of Appeal, 351 So. 2d 712, 714 (Fla. 1977).
69. State ex rel. Atlanta Coast Line R.R. v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So.
681 (1922).
70. Department of Admin. v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). For a more
detailed discussion of this case, see notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
71. Department of Environ. Reg. v. Leon County, 344 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
The court reaffirmed the general rule that determining the constitutionality of statutes and
adopted rules is an exercise of the judicial power which is vested only in the courts. To reach
the holding that an administrative agency may pass on the constitutionality of a proposed
rule, the court compared such action to a legislature's or legislative committee's not enacting
or reporting favorably upon legislation considered unconstitutional. The First District argued
that the process of reviewing the constitutionality of proposed legislation or proposed rules
does not usurp the judicial function, but checks the power of the decisional body. Moreover,
the hearing officer's determinations are subject to judicial review. Id. at 298-99.
72. This position has been recently criticized. See Swan, supra note 43, passim.
73. In this context, direct review is the term used to signify judicial review after final
agency action as provided in FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (Supp. 1978).
74. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(2) (Supp. 1978).
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section 120.72(1) purports to make exclusive the judicial remedies
provided by the act,78 the APA was amended in 1975 to provide that
no section in the APA is intended to divest the circuit courts of their
power to render declaratory judgments." Similarly, the APA cannot
limit the constitutional powers of the circuit court" to issue injunc-
tions and extraordinary writs.7" Thus, despite the legislature's hav-
ing granted the district courts of appeal the power of direct review
of administrative action, collateral review by the circuit courts con-
tinues pursuant to their traditional equitable powers.7"
The general rule, however, is that judicial review of administra-
tive actions may not be had until the aggrieved party has exhausted
his administrative remedies." The companion doctrines of exhaus-
tion of remedies and primary jurisdiction" are not statutorily cre-
ated or constitutionally mandated jurisdictional limitations, but
judicially imposed restrictions on the power of a court to delineate
the interface between the spheres of judicial and administrative
action.2 The Supreme Court of Florida recently noted that "[t]he
determination of whether the circumstances of a particular contro-
versy warrant judicial intervention . . . is ultimately one of policy
rather than power." 3 The supreme court concluded that "as a gen-
eral proposition, the circuit court should refrain from entertaining
declaratory suits except in the most extraordinary cases, where the
party seeking to bypass usual administrative channels can demon-
strate that no adequate remedy remains available" 4 under the
APA. The extent of the circuit courts' authority to interfere in the
administrative process remains a heavily litigated area.
Thus far, the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has been a diffi-
75. Id. § 120.72(1)(a).
76. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-191, § 11 (codified at F.A. STAT. § 120.73 (Supp. 1978)).
77. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 5(b), 20(c)(3).
78. State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies applies where a claim is cognizable in the first
instance only by an administrative agency; judicial interference is withheld until the adminis-
trative process has run its course. Primary jurisdiction, on the other hand, applies where a
claim is initially cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body. In such a case, the judicial process
is suspended, pending referral of such issues to the administrative agency for determination.
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), quoted with approval in State ex
rel. Shevin v. Tampa Elec. Co., 291 So. 2d 45, 46-47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
82. 344 So. 2d at 589 (quoting 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 573 (1965)).
83. Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oakland Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So. 2d 695, 699
(Fla. 1978).
84. Id.
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cult obstacle to hurdle in any attempt to invoke circuit court juris-
diction. In State ex rel. Department of General Services v. Willis, 5
a general contractor sought an injunction from the circuit court to
restrain the Department of General Services from engaging in var-
ious bidding practices which he alleged were illegal.. The depart-
ment moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a
cause of action. The circuit court denied the motion, and the depart-
ment brought an original proceeding in prohibition in the District
Court of Appeal, First District, to prohibit the circuit court from
assuming jurisdiction.87 Granting the writ of prohibition, the court
argued that the contractor had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies in not having requested a section 120.578 hearing; conse-
quently, the circuit court could not assert jurisdiction."9 The court
left open the door for the assertion of the circuit courts' equitable
jurisdiction if the agency error was "so egregious or devastating that
the promised administrative remedy [would be] too little or too
late."'" .
Similarly, in School Board v. Mitchell," the First District pre-
cluded a state employee from seeking a declaratory judgment in
circuit court.2 When the employee's position was eliminated pur-
suant to a reorganization plan adopted by the school board, she
petitioned the circuit court for a declaratory judgment as to her
rights under her contract and under the statutory scheme which
regulates school system personnel. 3 Reversing the circuit court's
assertion of jurisdiction, the First District held that a court could
85. 344 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
86. The contractor alleged, inter alia, that the department had failed to require that the
contract be awarded to the lowest bidder, failed to prepare architectural drawings and specifi-
cations, used "closed" specifications so that only particular manufacturers could bid, and
failed to obtain the approval of the Division of Building Construction and Property Manage-
ment Maintenance, Id. at 584 n.1.
87. Id. at 584.
88. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1975) (current version at id. (Supp. 1978)). The court noted that
the legislature had conspicuously omitted from § 120.57 the sentence: "Failure to proceed
under this section shall not constitute failure to exhaust administrative remedies." Since this
provision was included in id. §§ 120.54(4)(d), .56(4) (current versions at id. §§ 120.54(4)(d),
.56(5) (Supp. 1978)), the court concluded that the legislative intent was that parties should
exhaust their available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. 344 So. 2d at
591.
89. 344 So. 2d at 591-92.
90. Id. at 590 (dictum).
91. 346 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
92. In addition to the declaratory action, the employee had sought judicial review of an
agency rule in the District Court of Appeal, First District. That action was stayed pending
the outcome of the declaratory action. Id. at 563.
93. FLA. STAT. §§ 231.02-.611 (1975) (current version at id. (1977 & Supp. 1978))..,
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not assert subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
judgment where the petitioner had failed to exhaust her administra-
tive remdies, 4 absent an egregious or devastating agency error
which would render the administrative remedy ineffectual. 5
In a third case, Carrollwood State Bank v. Lewis,9" a state bank
had petitioned the circuit court for declaratory and injunctive relief
because the administrative agency had not recognized the bank's
substantial interest in the matter and refused to afford it a hearing. 7
The First District affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, because the complaint did not allege that any statute
or rule was unconstitutional or that the administrative remedies
were inadequate. 8 In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Serv-
ices v. Artis," the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held
that temporary loss of income is not sufficiently irreparable harm
to justify assertion of the circuit court's equitable jurisdiction to
interfere with the administrative process. Similarly, the Fourth Dis-
trict has also held that a school board's decision to establish bound-
ary lines which were not acceptable to some parents was not so
egregious or devastating as to justify the assertion of circuit court
jurisdiction.1®
One notable exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine
has been recognized when the pleadings reveal a constitutional chal-
lenge to the facial validity or application of a statute, rule or regula-
tion. The Supreme Court of Florida utilized this rationale to uphold
the assertion of circuit court jurisdiction in an action which chal-
lenged the facial validity of a tax statute.'0' More recently, in Gulf
94. The petitioner had failed to request a hearing pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1975)
(current version at id. (Supp. 1978)). 346 So. 2d at 567. The court argued by analogy to the
traditional view of circuit courts' subject matter jurisdiction, which would not be asserted if
litigation on the same issue was proceeding in another tribunal or if a special tribunal had
been established to decide the specific controversy. Id. at 564.
95. Id. at 568.
96. 362 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
97. The Department of Banking and Finance had approved the location of a competing
branch bank across the street from the Carrollwood State Bank. Upon learning of the ap-
proval, Carrollwood State Bank twice petitioned the department for administrative hearings.
Both requests were denied, the department alleging that the bank was not a person whose
substantial interests were determined by the agency. Carrollwood State Bank requested a
formal order denying its request for administrative hearings, but never received one. Id. at
112. The court stated that the department's position was untenable. Id. at 113.
98. Id. at 116.
99. 345 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
100. School Bd. v. Constant, 363 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
101. Department of Revenue v. Amrep Corp., 358 So. 2d 1343, 1349 (Fla. 1978) (alterna-
tive holding). The plaintiffs challenged the validity of FLA. STAT. § 199.023(7) (1977) on the
basis that the exemption it provided for intercompany accounts receivable of affiliated groups
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Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc., 0 the
supreme court noted that since an administrative hearing officer
lacks the authority to consider the constitutional challenges raised
by the complaint, it would be pointless to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies."3 Although the court stated that the APA
did not displace circuit court jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of
facially unconstitutional agency rules or, by implication, statutes,
the court did sound one caveat: The mere assertion of a constitu-
tional issue does not automatically entitle a party to circumvent the
administrative remedies." 4 Thus, in State ex rel. Florida State
Board of Nursing v. Santora,'5 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, held that absent a "clear and positive statement '"', of the
constitutional challenge in the complaint, the circuit court must
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, however, has relaxed the clear and posi-
tive statement requirement by holding that the plaintiff should
have been granted the opportunity to amend his complaint before
dismissing it with prejudice." 7
C. Standard of Review in the District Courts of Appeal
In McDonald v. Department of Banking & Finance, 0 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, addressed the issue of what is
the appropriate standard of review to apply to an agency rejection
of a hearing officer's findings premised on a lack of competent sub-
stantial evidence. 10 McDonald applied to the Department of Bank-
ing and Finance for permission to open and operate a bank and was
conditionally granted authority. Subsequently, the Comptroller re-
voked the conditional approval and denied the application. McDon-
constituted a violation of equal protection. 358 So. 2d at 1345. The court upheld the assertion
of jurisdiction for two reasons: (1) FLA. STAT. § 26.012(2)(e) (1975) grants exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the circuit courts "[iun all cases involving legality of any tax assessment or toll;" and
(2) the complaint challenged the constitutional validity of the statutes. 358 So. 2d at 1348-
49.
102. 361 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1978).
103. Id. at 699 (citing Department of Revenue v. Young Am. Builders, 330 So. 2d 864
(Fla. 1st DCA 1976)).
104. Id. In the instant case, the constitutional challenge was to the very statute which
the administrative agency was attempting to apply. Id. at 697-98.
105. 362 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
106. Id. at 117.
107. Metropolitan Dade County v. Department of Commerce, 365 So. 2d 432, 434-35
(Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
108. 346 So. 2d 569, 578-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
109. For a discussion of the other issues in this case, see notes 49-65 and accompanying
text supra.
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ald then requested a section 120.57110 hearing. The hearing officer,
applying to his findings the criteria established in section
659.03(1),"' recommended that the charter be granted. But the de-
partment entered a final order rejecting the hearing officer's find-
ings of fact as not based on competent substantial evidence and
denied the application."'
When reviewing the decision of a hearing officer, an agency
must accord his findings of fact due deference and may not reject
them unless they were not based on competent substantial evidence
or the proceedings did not comply with the essential requirements
of law."' Similarly, a reviewing court must sustain an agency's find-
ings of fact unless they were not based on substantial competent
evidence."' Thus, a district court reviewing an agency's rejection of
a hearing officer's findings of fact is placed in a dilemma: How can
a court accord the same respect to both the agency's and the hearing
officer's contradictory findings of fact?"'5
To resolve the issue, the District Court of Appeal, First District,
adopted the analysis of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. "I Stating
that the hearing officer's findings are part of the record,"' the court
held that a reviewing court should accord them as much probative
force as they intrinsically command."' Thus, "when the question is
110. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (Supp. 1976) (current version at id. § 120.57 (Supp. 1978)).
111. Id. § 659.03(1) (1975) (repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, § 3(2)(t), effective
July 1, 1980) provides as follows:
(r) Upon the filing of an application, the department shall make an investi-
gation of:
(a) The character, reputation, financial standing and motives of the organ-
izers, incorporators and subscribers in organizing the proposed bank or trust
company.
(b) The need for banking or trust facilities or additional banking or trust
facilities, as the case may be, in the community where the proposed bank or the
principal'office of the proposed trust company is to be located, giving particular
consideration to the adequacy of existing banking or trust facilities and the need
for further banking or trust facilities in the locality.
(c) The present and future ability of the community to support the pro-
posed bank or the principal office of the proposed trust company and all other
existing banking or trust facilities in the community.
(d) The character, financial responsibility, banking experience, and busi-
ness qualifications of the proposed officers.
(e) The character, financial responsibility, business experience, and stand-
ing of the proposed stockholders and directors.
112. 346 So. 2d at 575-77.
113. 346 So. 2d at 578; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(9) (Supp. 1978).
114. 346 So. 2d at 578; FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (Supp. 1978).
115. 346 So. 2d at 578.
116. 340 U.S. 474 (1951), cited in McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 578-79.
117. 346 So. 2d at 579; FLA. STAT. §§ 120.57(1)(b)(5)(f), .68(5)(a) (1975).
118. 346 So. 2d at 579.
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simply the weight or credibility of testimony by witnesses, or when
the factual issues are otherwise susceptible of ordinary methods of
proof, or when concerning those facts the agency may not rightfully
claim special insight,""' the reviewing court will accord greater pro-
bative force to the hearing officer's findings. Conversely, greater
weight will attach to the agency's findings if the contested issue is
founded upon matters of policy over which the agency has special
responsibility.
D. Appellate Procedure
The Supreme Court of Florida has the power, granted by the
Constitution of the State of Florida, to adopt and amend the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure.110 Exercising this power, the court
amended the Florida Appellate Rules so that, effective March 1,
1978, a new procedure became effective for commencing judicial
review of final agency action pursuant to section 120.68 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (Supp. 1978).12' The commentary to this revision con-
firms that the court was not attempting to propose rules which
conflict with the APA. 22 Nevertheless, the new rules do have an
important effect upon the filing of a request for appellate review
under the APA. Rather than using a petition for review, as would
be required by the language of section 120.68(2), the new rules elimi-
nate the use of the petition. Instead, a simple notice of appeal is
filed. 13 The committee notes state that the notice is to: "constitute
the petition required in Section 120.68(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.
1976). There is no conflict with the statute since the substance of
the review proceeding remains controlled by the statute and the
Legislature directed review be pursuant to the procedures set forth
in these rules.' 1 2'
V. RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE APA
Notwithstanding the role of the judiciary in developing limita-
tions on the legislature, the legislature's role in administrative law
remains important. That role consists of not only creating laws but
also monitoring and changing these laws by new legislation. Thus,
the legislative process itself provides an alternative forum for re-
119. Id.
120. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
121. In re Proposed Florida Appellate Rules, 351 So. 2d 981, 993-95 (Fla. 1977).
122. See id. at 996.
123. FLA. R. App. P. 9.110(b).
124. 351 So. 2d at 994.
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view. This holds significance not only in affecting judicial decisions
but also in producing new procedural and substantive developments
of the APA.
For example, several definitional changes have narrowed the
scope of application of the APA. The definition of "agency"'' 5 was
amended 2 ' to exclude any legal entity or agency created pursuant
to the Joint Power Act.'2 Also recently excluded from the definition
of "agency" are the Industrial Relations Commission and the judges
of industrial claims.2 8 Similarly, the definition of "rule"' 29 was
amended to exclude preparations or modifications of curricula by
educational units.30 "Rule" was redefined further in 1978 to exclude
a change in established hunting and fishing seasons if such changes
are adequately noticed by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation or by broadcasting in an electronic medium.'
Recent amendments also alter the responsibility placed upon
an agency for assuring public and governmental awareness of
agency actions concerning current or proposed rules. Certain eco-
nomic information may no longer be readily available. The required
information in the mandated economic impact statement'32 was re-
duced and generalized.' The agency is no longer required: (1) to
employ professionally accepted methodology; (2) to quantify the
data used in preparation of the statement; (3) to describe the long
and short term consequences; (4) to state the cost-benefit relation
of action to nonaction; or (5) to determine whether the proposed
action represents the most efficient allocation of public resources. "14
Instead, the new amendment requires: (1) an estimate of the cost
to the agency of implementing the proposed rule; (2) an estimate of
the cost or economic benefit to persons directly affected by the rule;
(3) an estimate of the impact the rule would have on competition
and the employment market; and (4) a statement of the methodol-
125. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1) (Supp. 1976).
126. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-425, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1)(b) (Supp. 1978)).
127. FLA. STAT. §§ 361.10-.18 (1977).
128. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-290, § 12 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(14) (Supp. 1978)).
129. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(14) (Supp. 1976).
130. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-453, § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(14)(c)(4) (1977)).
Educational units are defined as local school districts, community college districts, the Flor-
ida School for the Deaf and units of the State University System other than the Board of
Regents. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(6) (Supp. 1978).
131. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-425, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(14)(d) (Supp. 1978)).
132. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2) (1977).
133. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-425, § 2 (codified at FA. STAT. § 120.54(2) (Supp. 1978)).
134. Compare FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a) (1977) with id. (Supp. 1978).
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ogy and data used.' The amendment does provide, however, that
failure to provide an economic impact statement shall be grounds
for invalidating a rule. But after October 1, 1978, there is a one-
year limitation on any challenge to a rule for failure to provide a
statement.'
Other amendments attempt to increase public awareness of
agency proceedings. The required quantum of notice of an agency's
intention to adopt, repeal or amend a rule was expanded by requir-
ing that the proposed rule be available to the public for inspection
and copying." 7 A 1978 amendment requires a public hearing on a
proposed rule upon request by a person affected by the rule.131 If no
request is made, the decision to conduct a public hearing is within
the agency's discretion. Prior to the amendment, the APA required
only that a person affected by a contemplated rule be given the
opportunity to present evidence and argument on all the issues
under consideration.' In 1977, an amendment also increased the
information required to be filed with the Administrative Procedures
Committee.' Before adopting a rule, an agency must now file a
statement which either describes the extent to which the rule estab-
lishes standards more restrictive than federal standards, states that
the proposed rule is no more restrictive than federal standards, or
states that no federal standards controlling the same subject exist.
Further significant developments:
Once notice of a proposed rule has been given pursuant to sec-
tion 120.54(1),"' changes in proposed rules prior to their adoption
can be made under certain circumstances."' An additional basis
which would justify a change was added in 1978 by allowing an
agency to alter a proposed rule in response to written material re-
ceived by the agency within fourteen days after the notice and there-
after made a part of the record of the proceeding.1 3
A 1977 amendment to section 120.54(12) of the Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1976) clarified that rules not filed with the Department of
State shall become effective upon adoption by the agency head or
135. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-425, § 2(a) (codified at FiA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a) (Supp.
1978)).
136. Id. § 2(c) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(c) (Supp. 1978)).
137. Id. § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(b) (Supp. 1978)).
138. Id. § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (Supp. 1978)).
139. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1977).
140. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-453, § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(11)(a) (1977)).
141. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1) (Supp. 1978).
142. Id. § 120.54(12)(b).
143. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-425, § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(12)(b) (Supp. 1978)).
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at some later date specified by rule or statute. "'
The qualifications required of a hearing officer 45 were amended
in 1978, increasing the number of years the officer is required to be
a member in good standing of the Florida Bar from three to five.",
Another amendment altered the power of administrative agen-
cies to enforce subpoenas or orders directing recovery:" 7 An agency
may no longer hold someone in contempt for failure to comply.148
The agency must now file a petition for enforcement 4 in the circuit
court of the judicial circuit in which the individual against whom
enforcement is sought resides. Failure to comply with the court
order will result in a citation for contempt of court. 50
Section 120.57(1)(b)(9) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976)
was amended so that a court which has reversed an agency's order
may award attorney's fees without having to find that the agency
acted maliciously or in bad faith.'
The licensing provisions of the APA were modified. The time
limit for approval or denial of license applications,was amended to
allow for a statutory shortening of the usual ninet *-day period pro-
vided by law.'52 This period will now be tolled by the initiation of a
proceeding under section 120.57 and shall resume ten days after the
recommended order is submitted to the agency and the parties.'53
A new section concerning proceedings for the issuance, denial, re-
newal or amendment of a license or approval of a merger pursuant
to title XXXVII14 or title XXXVII' 55 of the Florida Statutes was
added in 197715 and revised in 1978.11 The new section requires the
Department of Banking and Finance to publish in the Florida Ad-
ministrative Weekly notice of the application within twenty-one
days of its receipt.'58 The department will conduct a hearing if re-
quested by any person within twenty-one days after the publication
144. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-453, § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(12) (1977)).
145. FLA. STAT. § 120.65(2) (1977).
146. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-425, § 9 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.65(2) (Supp. 1978)).
147. FLA. STAT. § 120.58(3) (1977).
148. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-425, § 7 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.58(3) (Supp. 1978)).
149. FLA. STAT. § 120.69(1)(a) (1977).
150. Id. § 120.58(3) (Supp. 1978).
151. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-453, § 5 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(9) (1977)).
152. 1978 id., ch. 78-95, § 57 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.60(2) (Supp. 1978)).
153. 1977 id., ch. 77-453, § 6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.60(2) (Supp. 1978)).
154. FLA. STAT. §§ 654.001-661.44 (1977 & Supp. 1978).
155. Id. §§ 665.011-.717.
156. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-453, § 6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.60(3) (1977)).
157. 1978 id., ch. 78-425, § 8 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.60(3) (Supp. 1978)).
158. FLA. STAT. § 120.60(3)(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
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of the notice. 5' Notice of the hearing will be published at the cost
of the applicant or licensee, in a newspaper of general circulation
in the area affected by the application.' 0 If a new license is neither
approved nor denied within 180 days after receipt of the original
application, or a timely request for additional information or correc-
tions, or within thirty days after a public hearing on the application,
whichever is the latest, the license will be deemed approved, subject
to satisfactory completion of certain statutory conditions. 6' More-
over, the legislature increased the permissible methods of notifying
the licensee of revocation, suspension, annulment or withdrawal of
any license. In addition to service by certified mail, agencies may
now provide notice by actual service to the licensee. 2 If service is
not possible by either of the above two methods, constructive service
is permissible.' 3
Finally, section 120.68(3) 1 was amended in 1978 to clarify that
a petition to the agency is not a prerequisite to a petition for super-
sedeas in a court.'16
VI. TRENDS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Presently, the United States is experiencing a proliferation of
administrative regulations. Often, the expansion of regulatory
schemes results in numerous agencies at multiple levels of govern-
ment being granted concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject
matter.'6 This multitude of agencies leads to duplicative proceed-
ings and inconsistent rulings.'
The duplicative hearings and their attendant problems could
be greatly reduced by consolidating multiple proceedings. Such a
159. Id. § 120.60(3)(a)(2).
160. Id. § 120.60(3)(b).
161. Id. § 120.60(3)(c).
162. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-453, § 6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.60(5) (1977)).
163. 1978 id., ch. 78-425, § 8 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.60(5) (Supp. 1978)).
164. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1977).
165. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-425, § 11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (Supp. 1978)).
166. For example, if an individual desired to build a development which discharged
effluents into Biscayne Bay, the development could fall within the jurisdiction of five separate
agencies. First, the Director of Environmental Resources Management is empowered to regu-
late and enforce air and water pollution standards in Dade County. METRO. DADE COUNTY,
FLA., CODE § 24-5 (1959). The development might also require a permit from the South
Florida Water Management District. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.069(2)(e), .106 (Supp. 1978). The
Floriaa Department of Environmental Regulation will also be involved, id. § 403.88, as might
the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, id. § 380.07(2) (1977). On the federal
level, the United States Corps of Engineers may be involved, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1976).
167. E.g., Barnard v. Carey, 60 F. Supp. 539 (D. Ohio 1945).
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consolidation of agency procedures would benefit the administrative
system in several ways. First, by consolidating the procedures the
system would operate more economically, for both the agency and
the individuals. In addition, a consolidated proceeding would pro-
vide a forum where all relevant issues might be presented and re-
solved in a consistent manner. Finally, the time involved in acquir-
ing all the necessary agency determinations could be considerably
reduced by curtailing the repetitive hearings.
Recently, Florida, in conjunction with the federal government,
has implemented a consolidation procedure in the area of environ-
mental regulation; with the United States Army Corps of Engineers,
the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation entered into
an arrangement consolidating many procedures.' 8 The department
and the corps agreed, inter alia, to delineate their jurisdictions"9
and hold joint public hearings, 70 and have established joint applica-
tion forms.'
There is, however, a limit on the extent to.which multiple
agency proceedings may be consolidated: the delegation doctrine.7 2
In Florida, the doctrine has been stated thus: "The legislature may
not delegate the power . . . to exercise an unrestricted discretion in
applying a law; but it. . .may expressly authorize designated offi-
cials within definite valid limitations to provide rules and regula-
tions for the complete operation and enforcement of the law within
its expressed general purpose."'7 Recently, the Supreme Court of
Florida reaffirmed the vitality of the doctrine and held unconstitu-
tional a statute which lacked a legislative delineation of priorities
to guide the agency.'
Thus, not only must the legislature define the priorities which
are to guide and limit agency discretion, but the agency may act
only within the standards provided by the legislature. An analogous
result was reached by the Supreme Court of the United States in
168. Memorandum of Understanding Between Corps of Engineers and Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation on Permit Processing and Enforcement in the Waters of
the State (Aug. 19, 1976), reprinted in FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 17-4 at.16II (1976).
169. Id. at 16LLL.
170. Id.; See U.S. AMY CoRPs OF ENGINEERS, FLA. DEP'T OF ENVRON. REG., & FA. DEP'T
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, APPLICATION FOR CONSTRUCTION, DREDGING AND FILLING IN THE WATERS
OF FLORIDA, reprinted in FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 17-1 at 2X55, 2X58-59 (1969).
171. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 172, at 2X65-69.
172. For a more complete discussion of the delegation doctrine, see notes 14-33 and
accompanying text supra.
173. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 56 Fla. 617, 636-37, 47 So. 969, 976 (1908) (em-
phasis added).
174. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 919 (Fla. 1978).
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Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong. 75 In Hampton the United States Civil
Service Commission had adopted regulations which barred nonciti-
zens, including lawfully admitted resident aliens, from obtaining
employment in the civil service. The petitioners, alleging a denial
of equal protection, "' brought an injunctive action against the Civil
Service Commission to enjoin it from these practices.'77 The Com-
mission attempted to justify its position by referring the Court to
various considerations within the purview of the federal government
which would provide a rational basis for their decision.' Rejecting
these justifications, the Court stated that the Commission had no
responsibility for foreign affairs, treaty negotiations, establishing
immigration quotas or naturalization policies. Rather, the Commis-
sion had a limited and specific function: "to adopt and enforce
regulations which [would] best promote the efficiency of the fed-
eral civil service."'' Consequently, these other considerations could
not provide a rational basis for the regulation; the Commission
could not use factors outside of its legislative mandate to justify its
actions.
The implication of the delegation doctrine for the trend toward
consolidation of procedures is clear. To the extent that consolidated
procedures result in agency action premised on standards and prior-
ities other than those mandated by their constitutive legislation,
such action should be invalidated as ultra vires the agency. Thus,
if the trend towards consolidation is to acquire any significant mo-
mentum, the legislature must draft regulatory schemes in which the
priorities and standards for the regulation of particular subject mat-
ter are uniform for all the agencies that have jurisdiction over the
subject matter.'8
175. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
177. 426 U.S. at 90-93.
178. Id. at 99-117.
179. Id. at 114.
180. The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that if a Florida statute is
patterned after a federal law, the Florida statute should be construed in the same manner as
the federal statute. This attempt at uniformity, however, is limited to the extent that "such
construction is harmonious with the spirit and policy of Florida legislation on the subject."
Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Relation Comm'n, 353 So. 2d 108, 116
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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